by Randall Rowe – rowerand@gmail.com
Mr. Rowe is a graduate of Michigan State University with a B.A. in Russian and East European Studies.
On February 17, 2008, before a quorum of the Assembly of Kosovo, a new country officially asserted its independence from Serbia and became The Republic of Kosovo. Soon after this proclamation, the international community began to take sides. The United States and Western Europe quickly recognized the young nation, thus legitimizing Kosovo’s move for independence in some circles. This support was consistent with these countries past rhetoric and policy, including the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.
However other circles did not support the break-way region of the former Yugoslavia, most notably the circle lead by Russia, and consequently, the nations still in the politically powerful sphere of influence of this largest country on earth. Given the historically dominant (and under the Milosevic regime oppressive) Serbian majority, it seems that many countries would or perhaps should be in favor of a sovereign Kosovo region. But for several reasons, Russia does not view this situation from the same perspective as the United States, its former Cold War enemy.
Shared Culture and Alliances with Serbia
Czarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and contemporary Russia, have historically been close friends and allies with Serbia, the largest republic in the former Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia is a very diverse region, in which most of the population shares a common Slavic heritage with Russia and Eastern Europe. Some countries which resulted from the breakup of this formerly communist country, share even their alphabet (Cyrillic) and predominant religion (Orthodox Christianity) with Russia. Serbia is one of the countries with time-tested ties and alliances to Russia.
The depth of this historic alliance was demonstrated in the events which precipitated the First World War. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife by Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, on June 28, 1914 in Sarajevo resulted in a retaliatory declaration of war from the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the Kingdom of Serbia. Russia, unwillingly to lose her interests in the Balkans, mobilized the Czarist army in defense of its ally, Serbia. Of course, this game of alliance dominos initiated what was to become the First World War.
In World War II, a swift military campaign from Hitler’s Nazi Germany resulted in occupation of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia until the end of the war in 1945. Like many other post-war Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia became a communist state closely aligned with the Soviet Union, under Marshal Tito (Josip Broz). The communists came to power with the help and influence of Stalin and remained benevolent and cooperative until 1948, when the two countries split paths. After the Tito-Stalin split, Yugoslavia (still a Socialist Republic) remained neutral in the Cold War and worked on forming an alliance of smaller countries that would be non-aligned with the Cold War powers.
The late 1980’s ushered in a new economic and cultural era for both the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. This led to the rise of Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic and eventually the dissolution of both countries in the 1990’s. During Milosevic’s reign of terror, including his “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo, Russia didn’t blink an eye to either Yugoslavia’s or Kosovo’s protests. There was speculation about Russian aid to Milosevic’s murderous campaigns; however, this speculation is unproven. The most support from Russia that could ever be proven was the granting of political asylum for members of the Milosevic family.
Though Russia’s actions regarding Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo were technically neutral, their choice not to interfere certainly was an act of guilt by inaction. Given its considerable influence in the Balkans, especially with Serbia, and the fact that Russian relations with the West in the 1990’s were the best they had been since World War II, Russia could have acted as a mediator. However, officially the Federation of Russia acted in the same manner as the former Yugoslavia did during the Cold War, and did not get involved in its friend’s conflicts. This strategy seemed to be safer in an effort to appease both sides of the conflict, a time tested ally (Serbia) and the United States, an old foe turned tentatively a new friend.
Currently, Russia’s action on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence does not mirror its neutral policies of the 1990’s. By abandoning the diplomacy of the 90’s, Prime Minister Putin, and President Medvedev, have made the country’s position abundantly clear. Certainly, there are positive political rewards for them internally that will result from the strong, unwavering position on this international stalemate with the West.
Political Gains at Another’s Expense
Having faced humiliation of immense proportion during the early and mid 1990’s with the breakup of the Soviet Union and under the new leadership of a young, charismatic, and nationalistic leader, Vladimir Putin, Russia was eager to take its rightful place on the world scene. Putin, whose name literally means ‘man of the path’, has made a positive reputation for himself by standing solidly against the West. Though tensions may never return to the same intensity of the Cold War era, Putin’s display of nationalistic strength has been a far cry from the often ‘lap dog’ tendencies of his weak and indecisive predecessor, Boris Yeltsin.
This type of grab for power at an outsider’s expense is nothing new to Russia. Both Yeltsin and Putin led military campaigns against the separatist region of Chechnya during their administrations. This proved to benefit both leaders’ public approval. In the early stages of both Chechen wars, the majority white, Christian, Russian population was united under these leaders who took a stance against a culturally different adversary, the Muslim Chechens.
In 1979, when the Soviet Union entered into a very unpopular military war against neighboring Afghanistan, the intentions of its last communist President, Mikhail Gorbachev, were political gain for the Communists. The war was also intended as a tool to oppress other Muslim minorities (Chechnya et al.) residing within the Soviet Union. The initial idea of the Soviet powers was to engage in a swift military campaign against the poorest, predominantly Muslim nation, thus gaining territory as well as crushing agitators of Muslim nationalism on their southern doorstep. At the time, the eventual defeat of the Soviet Union shocked the international community. The Afghan War not only failed to serve its purpose, but also is cited as a reason by many Russians today as a main catalyst for the Soviet Union’s fall from prominence.
In not recognizing the independence of Kosovo, Russia is staying consistent in its centuries’ long foreign relations with Serbia. But more interestingly, its position on Kosovo is yielding domestic political gains for those currently leading Russia. An official proclamation of support for Serbia is a direct contradiction to the position of the West. This has greater weight in Russia than many outside observers might think. As long as the Kremlin holds the line against the ‘wicked wishes of the West’, then the men behind these decisions are regarded as champions of returning the heroic Russian Motherland to her former prominence in the world.
When during the Bush Administration, the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic moved to install missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, Russia viewed this as an act of no confidence and aggression. As the tension grew, a rebuttal was issued in the form of a refusal of recognition for the Republic of Kosovo. It is too early in the Obama Administration to see where this issue will end up although President Obama recently visited Russia in what many observers have described as a fence mending trip.
Security Council Resolution 1244
Resolution 1244 was passed by the United Nations Security Council on June 10, 1999. This Resolution dealt with the future control of a post war Kosovo. Among the many provisions in Resolution 1244, the section “Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,” was of greatest concern to Russia. Russia cited this particular resolution, specifically this section as its reason for calling an emergency meeting of the Security Council to oppose the independence of Kosovo. The Russian delegation felt that this part of the Resolution asserted that the sovereign integrity of Serbia must remain intact. Under Russia’s interpretation, this sovereign integrity means a Serbia including Kosovo.
However, Resolution 1244 “Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.” This passage of the Resolution refers to Kosovo as within the ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (Serbia), although the language clearly provides for eventual self-governance and autonomy of Kosovo. This Resolution already established a system of international governance for administrative purposes, and according to Russia, there was not yet a need for an independent Kosovo, and there might never be a need for autonomy.
The question this Resolution raised was the interpretation of “interim.” According to the United States and most of the European Union, February 2008 was the appropriate time for Kosovo to declare independence and assert its own self governance, separate from the Republic of Serbia. On the other hand, Russia believes the Assembly of Kosovo acted in defiance of and violated Resolution 1244, and thus Kosovo’s independence should not be recognized as legitimate.
However facetious this reason may be, it seems as though a simple resolution providing for the international legitimization of Kosovo’s independence as well as clearly redefining the sovereign integrity of Serbia could solve the problem. If this seems like too easy a solution, it’s because it is! Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, along with China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Part of being a permanent member is having the privilege to be able to veto any action of the Council at Whole. So essentially, in the event that a push for legitimization by the UN Security Council would materialize in a meeting, Russia’s powerful veto would swoop down and demolish any hope of a resolution passing.
A Slippery Slope?
What do Kosovo, Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia all have in common? They are all regions with distinct cultural roots and even different languages located in countries with much larger ethnic majorities who have administrative control and political power.
From a Russian perspective, these are just four regions that fit the above description, with scores more unaccounted for. Russia fears that recognizing an act such as the declaration of independence of Kosovo, could ignite a drive for independence in so many more regions, and perhaps turn into a flame that would spread to other politically unstable parts of the former Soviet Union.
Each of these region’s separatists and nationalistic ambitions are unique to the region and ethnic group that resides there. It is a flawed generalization to expect the same reaction from each breakaway region simply because of some situational similarities. Russia is afraid of a gain in confidence behind these ambitions for two reasons.
The first reason concerns regions that are not currently included in the Russian Federation. This is the case for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two separatist territories lying within the boundaries of Georgia, a former Soviet republic.
Abkhazia consists of an ethnic majority of Abkhaz people with minorities of Georgian and Russian people. The citizens in the region desire to be autonomous from the country of Georgia. Georgia disagrees. Russia supports Abkhazia’s claim to independence largely due to an anti-Russian Georgian president, as well as prominent pro-Russian attitudes in Abkhazia. The Abkhaz journey towards independence started with a break from Georgia in 1991. Following a brief war with Georgia in 2008 and just four months after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Russia recognized the Republic of Abkhazia. However, Abkhazia is still regarded as a part of Georgia by the United Nations.
When the Soviet Union disbanded, and the new borders were drawn, there was little regard for the many ethnic groups that called this massive former empire home. This is the situation in South Ossetia. In northern Georgia, the region of South Ossetia is home to a majority of Ossetians, right across the border in the Russian region of North Ossetia also resides a majority of Ossetians. The South desires to be autonomous from Georgia, mainly because it identifies more with North Ossetia in Russia.
In August 2008, this conflict boiled over in what was dubbed the South Ossetian war. Russia came to the aid of this small region in northern Georgia, when the military of Georgia tried to protect its border’s integrity by eliminating the push for independence. The result was disastrous for Georgia. A stronger Russian army quickly fought back the weaker, less funded Georgian army, in a strong move to protect the South Ossetians. This situation is cited by Russia as a perfect example of the consequences of recognizing some separatist’s enclaves over others. The double standard exists in South Ossetia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo as independent. They are clearly touting the Russian line, and subjecting themselves to Soviet Union style influence. If this is twisted by Russia and tolerated by the international community it could set a dangerous precedent in former satellite nations.
The second reason that Russia fears a gain in nationalistic ambitions of local regions concerns the ongoing fight in Chechnya. Much like Kosovo, Chechnya is a separate ethnic and religious identity inside of Russia. Since the days of the Czarist Empire, Russian leaders have been trying to subdue the push for autonomy from the Northern Caucuses’ region. So much so, that numerous wars have been fought, and over the past decade, there has been a constant Russian military presence in the area. Russian fears are fueled by the obvious similarities between these two breakaway republics. After fighting so fiercely to maintain control and influence in the region, Russia would be foolish to hypocritically recognize a country with a very similar claim for independence.
Russia fears how international support for Kosovo could change the situation or even ignite stagnant military operations in the Chechnya. The consequences of enthusiastic recognition of Kosovo might follow a slippery slope concept for other predominantly Muslim enclaves in Russia.
Silencing the Whistleblowers
The Russian human rights organization, Memorial, is well known for the documentation of abductions, killings and intimidation of government critics and separatists in Chechnya. The woman responsible for the proficiency of this documentation was named Natalya Estemirova. Tragically, on the morning of July 15, 2009, Ms. Estemirova was abducted on her way to work in the Chechen capitol of Grozny. Eight hours later her murdered body was found, on the border of the neighboring province of Ingushetia.
The current de-facto president of Chechnya, Ramzan A. Kadyrov, enjoys a comfortable network of political support from Moscow. This support is in part to President Kadyrov’s success in calming tensions in Russia’s most contentious area. However, what Ms. Estemirova and her colleagues at Memorial were investigating was the manner of President Kadyrov’s tactics. Nataliya Estemirova, Anna Politkovskaya (a Russian investigative journalist who was earlier assassinated), and many other advocates of human rights charge that President Kadyrov and his Kremlin backed administration and security force, have employed kidnappings, intimidation and murder in order to quell the separatists cry. It is charged that, in the security forces effort to cover their proverbial tracks of corruption and terror, activists and journalists are suffering the same fate as militant separatists. As of August 11, 2009, two children’s rights workers, Zarema Sadulayeva and Alik Dzhabrailov, were found dead in a suburb of Grozny; again Kadyrov’s forces are the suspected aggressors. These charges are vehemently denied by President Kadyrov.
Russia desires order in the unstable region of Chechnya and since February 2007, President Kadyrov has used force, if necessary, to squash any high scale conflicts. Often, human rights activists are caught in the crosshairs of this violent region. The blame is on the president’s security forces, who rights activists say are using abductions, and torture to destroy any existing separatist factions.
All cries of foul play have been met with a Russian promise of investigation. President Dmitri Medvedev has condemned the murder of Ms. Estemirova, and has renewed his promise to restore law and order in Russia. Just as in the case of Anna Politkovskaya, the Russian court may offer an end but not a solution.
On August 8th, 2009, a judge in Moscow decided to retry two accomplices in the murder of Ms. Politkovskaya. Though the retrial was ordered by the Supreme Court after the initial acquittal of the two men, the judge is not allowing a new investigation to occur, including the use of new evidence in the prosecution. The Russian judicial system is simply offering the two accomplices as an end, they are not the ones who committed or more importantly ordered the murder. Instead the show trial of these two men is meant as an answer to public outcry.
What Does This Mean for Kosovo and the International Community?
Most of Russia’s reasons for its staunch stance on Kosovo are more politically based rather than diplomatic or case dependent. There has been a crime of generalization which has taken place. Each region is different, and has experienced unique circumstances, which supports their calls for independence. This means that each breakaway region’s cry should be heard and evaluated differently.
Appeasement because of time-tested alliances can often interfere with rational decision making. In Kosovo’s situation, what is in the best interests for Serbia may be completely irrelevant to Russia, thus the situation should be handled without bias by Russia. Which it is not the case. Instead Russia is honoring a century old symbiotic relationship between the two Slavic countries, which is becoming more problematic on the larger world stage.
Russia has continued its belligerence toward the West in its official policy. This must change if any progress in international cooperation is to be made, specifically in accepting the independence of Kosovo. This becomes difficult when, by taking a hard stance against what they term as ‘Western Aggressors’, Russian leaders are revered by many in their own country.
The solution for the West? Seems simple; stop the aggression. Missile defense systems in Eastern Europe should be regarded as a superfluous and intimidating gesture towards Russia and discontinued immediately. These systems have proven to be harmful in keeping relations with Russia friendly. This is important because cooperation is essential with a world power such as Russia. The vast country still wields incredible influence in much of the world and could prove to be a crucial ally in the very near future.
Continuing dialogue with both Georgia and Russia regarding the situations in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechnya should be a top priority for both the United States and the UN. The United States and the UN should work with both countries to encourage whatever is best for the citizens in these regions. Perhaps if compromises could be reached, then a compromise may also be achieved regarding Kosovo.
However unlikely this may seem, one step in the right direction is certainly better than one step in the wrong direction. Understanding in this situation may never be reached, because it is nearly impossible to satisfy all parties involved. But all parties involved have a duty and humane responsibility to really consider the situation not by their own desires, but by what is best for the people who live in Kosovo. Considering the history of strong and often violent ethnic tensions in the area, fueled by historical claims to the land, the self governed independence of Kosovo is the best outcome for all parties involved, especially for the hapless residents of The Republic of Kosovo.
Postscript
Just as this article was being completed, Clifford J. Levy reporting from Moscow in an article entitled “Defining Genocide Down” published in The New York Times on August 9, 2009 (at page 4), wrote:
“Russia has long been indignant over Western support for Kosovo …. The NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, which was intended to prevent the Serbs from suppressing ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, had especially angered people here. With the South Ossetian conflict, the Kremlin saw hypocrisy, asking why it was proper for the West to deploy force to support Kosovo in the face of supposed Serbian violence against civilians, but not for Russia to do the same thing for South Ossetia. The Russians … ventured that if the West can call Serbian actions genocide, then the term fits the Georgians as well.”
On August 13, 2009, The New York Times reported on Prime Minister Putin’s trip to Abkhazia where he promised 15 billion rubles to build a Russian military base and reinforce the boundary between Abkhazia and the remainder of Georgia.
Conclusion
What this commentary means to me and the reason I wrote this article and titled it “Fallout” is that American foreign policy leaders and makers need to take a more holistic and logically consistent view of conflicts in faraway places. Looking at recent events from a Russian viewpoint, one cannot understand why America’s leaders have supported both Kosovo and Georgia. Logically, America should have supported Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia if our foreign policy is to be Wilsonian in nature offering support for oppressed ethnic/national groups yearning for independence from larger states. Or if we support the absolute national sovereignty/territorial integrity of nation states against internal separatist groups, then logically we should have supported Serbia and Georgia (or perhaps the former Soviet Union when Georgia broke away).