An Informal Look at Democratic Ideals and Democratic Realities
By David Armando Zelaya
Democracy, much like anything else, loses its sense of charm when studied diligently. It no longer seems elegant, inspiring, or special. Much to the disappointment of cherished ideals, it begins to look like an over-complicated dastardly thing that more deserves scorn than praise. However, once we see democracy for what it is and not for what we wish it to be, productive thought can begin in earnest concerning how exactly democracy can be used for the benefit of humanity.
The following is an attempt at an informal but sober analysis. Specifically, it tries to address the behavior of democracy’s constituent parts, how democracy relates to other subjects and, how democracy and all it encompasses can affect the desperate circumstances of some of today’s most conflicted, divided, and poorest nations. The methodology, though informal, is rooted in a tradition of rigorous scientific analysis. It indirectly utilizes statistical inquiry, mathematical models, and case study analysis in an effort to ensure consistency and avoid fallacy. The focus on a scientific foundation is not meant to detract from the clearly human nature of the subject; rather, it is meant to strengthen it by exemplifying the humanity in peoples across this globe regardless of race, religion, nationality, social class, or political persuasion.
That being said, this article is a far cry from being comprehensive in relation to any specific theories or disciplines. Some of the topics that are glossed over here have had whole books written about them. For further detail concerning the intricacies of many of these ideas, I would advise a reading of the sources used in this discussion. What is conveyed here is really a foundation, a first step, so to speak, in a long journey.
This discussion will span several articles, all related in terms of methodology, a commitment to informality, and in their focus on democracy. They differ in that they look at different aspects of democratic government. For instance, this article is an introduction of sorts. It surveys some of the main theories concerning democracy’s behavior. Subsequent articles will focus on the domestic nature of democratic political parties, democracies in the international arena, case studies both in the developed and under-developed world, and the relationship between economics and democratic institutions.
The final hope is that a realistic evaluation and discussion of democratic ideas can commence among a broader group of people. Though, already long underway, this discussion has been shrouded in complex mathematics, technical jargon, and supposed irrelevance. In its stead there now stands an endless argument of opinion and conjecture that, though heartfelt, is built atop weak foundations and accomplishes little. In a time when democracy is rightfully seen as a possible path towards better administration, the wishful and fanciful ideals of dreamers must be tossed aside in favor of a disciplined and cautious telling of the democratic story.
Act I – Dreams are Dashed
First and foremost, I would like to note a general theme: The elegance and verve of a statement bear little relation to its degree of truth. In libraries across the world there are stacks of books written by countless authors from time immemorial whose imagination and beauty cannot be denied but whose truth is questionable. That being said, rule by the people is quite elegant as far as phrases go.
In keeping with a general tone of irreverence, the following is asked: What makes a government democratic? Who rules in a democracy? And, what can be gained or lost through democratic means? To anticipate my conclusion, I will say that, though the general citizenry does play a large role in democratic processes, they most certainly do not rule in the commonly understood meaning of the word. Furthermore, given democracy’s strengths and shortcomings, on the whole it can provide a population with a stable and moderate government if understood and applied cautiously.
Scene i- The Setting
Democracy can take many forms differentiated by countless degrees of variation in multiple dimensions. For instance, a democracy may be unicameral as opposed to bicameral or tetracameral. It could be comprised of a single voting district or thousands of them further divided into larger federal entities. Some have tried democracy via representation and others through referendum. The variation in form is quite immense. Furthermore, democracies share a great many traits with other forms of government such as monarchies, military juntas, and single party dictatorships. What then are the traits that, at a minimum, characterize a democratic government?
Both Anthony Downs and William Riker, who are widely viewed as experts in the subject, have proposed the following three traits as central to the generally held view of democracy: Liberty, Equality, and Participation (Downs, 1987; Riker, 1982). In Mr. Riker’s case, he actually used a sample of 5 representative documents to isolate these three traits (Riker, 1982). Keep in mind, however, that along with having been associated with democratic government, these three words have also been the justification for some of histories bloodiest wars and tyrannies. Liberty, taken to its extreme, is anarchy without laws, protections, or stability; Equality unrestrained has in the past led to vast contradictions that have only ended in its opposite; Participation unchecked has both paralyzed governments and handed them over to narrow but powerful interests groups (Downs, 1987). Furthermore, within democracies themselves, the meanings of these three ideas have changed (Downs, 1987). The American government of 1787 would now not hold up to society’s democratic standards in light of the progressive importance of civil rights. The meanings of these three ideas must therefore be restrained to allow for a coherent conception of democracy.
To further complicate things, Democracy has also been equated to voting. It is quite difficult, if not impossible, to imagine democracy without voting. Yet, it is quite easy to think of examples where voting occurs undemocratically. For instance, in China’s single party communist government, party members of the provincial level vote for party and Government leadership, yet China’s government has never seriously been seen as democratic (Becker, 2000). Likewise, in the U.N.’s Security Council there are fifteen voting members but only five are permanent and only they have the power to unilaterally veto a resolution (United Nations, 2009). This council has been called many things but democratic is not one of them. As these examples demonstrate, though voting is necessary for democracy it is far from sufficient.
The problem, therefore, is that there exist two compelling but competing views of democracy. Each has a strong argument as to why it should be equated thus. Each also has a strong set of shortcomings that hold them to be insufficient on their own merit. If we believe that the statements “Democracy equals liberty, equality, and participation” and “Democracy equals voting” are both true than it must be true that for both of them to exist they themselves must be equal to each other. This coincides with the view that the former concerns our ideals about how democracy should be and the latter relates to what democracy truly is and that it is at their intersection that both become valid (Riker, 1982).
The Intersection of our ideals and reality renders a product of lesser form than the one commonly desired. A democracy through this perspective can be defined as a government that upholds its citizenry’s opportunity to participate in voting pertaining to matters of government, complete equality among votes cast, and liberty to vote for anyone or anything. Liberty, Equality, and Participation need to pertain to voting to be coherent and voting needs to exemplify these ideals to be viewed as legitimate. What makes this view of democracy strange is that it is detached from the outcomes of democratic government. It emphasizes the process of voting not what that voting leads to (Riker, 1982).
Of course, these conditions imply sub-conditions necessary for their implementation and perpetuation. Of these sub-conditions, there is a set that pertains to the voters themselves and are often called rights. These rights for the most part, protect minorities and ensure their continued Participation, Liberty, and Equality in voting (Riker, 1982). Obviously, and for good reason, these rights have been extended and perpetuated due to their perceived morality. In the United States these are called civil rights and are enumerated in the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments to the Constitution. Another set of sub-conditions concern the continuation of the system itself. These ensure that the system cannot be changed or destroyed due to the volatile whims of majorities. These sub-conditions often take the form of divisions of power (to include federalism), requirements of super majorities to pass amendments, and, perhaps the most important, term limits accompanied by regularly held elections. Surprisingly, it is this final condition that allows for democracy to last beyond one generation (Riker, 1982). To fully understand the importance of term limits and regular elections it is necessary to move beyond our definition of democracy and understand something about how democracy works.
Scene ii- The Actors
As previously stated, in terms of practical use, voting plays a central role in democracy and is the mechanism through which democratic ideals are achieved; however, as a system of organizing social preferences, it has received much less fanfare than the other great organizer of preferences, the market. Not surprisingly, it has therefore received less criticism. While the inequities of the market are decried as criminal and immoral on political talk-shows, legislative floors, and undergraduate classrooms, very rarely have I been an audience to a similar critique of voting. The few times I have been witness to such a critique, it has been cast as a front for deeper political ambitions or as an attack on the ideals many hold to be self evident. This is strange, considering that while many markets are Pareto efficient (meaning that all actors who participate in a transaction are just as good or better off at its end as they were at its start) voting most certainly is not and its consequences in many cases translate to disastrous and at times bloody losses for the losing participants (Riker, 1982). These losses are no doubt widely publicized yet voting always seems to escapes blame. Instead, talk show pundits blame bitter partisanship, corrupt politicians, or whatever segment of the population happens to disagree with them.
The process of voting seems to be taken for granted. This is, of course, understandable if voting is viewed at face value. On a superficial level, voting boils down to the following: All voters say what they want and the option that is most wanted by all voters is chosen. This is simple enough and seems fair, yet when further scrutinized questions arise. First, who is voting? How do voters decide what they want? Are voters thinking of themselves or the entire group? Does the magnitude of available options change anything? How does a group know what is most wanted? When something is chosen, how do they know it to be the right choice? Finally, was voting even a fair way of deciding something for all voters (on a deeper level, what does “fair” mean)? In answering these questions, a clearer picture of democracy will come into view and what may now seem disparately related will be shown to be inextricably interconnected.
A fundamental question when discussing voting is- who is the voter? It is obvious that the answer is, the voter is a person who makes a choice within the context of an election. The question then becomes how do people make choices? In the field of behavioral science, the answer is, within the context of scarcity, people do what they want according to what they like. This idea is called Rationality (Arrow, 1951).The technical definition is: people make choices according to an ordering of transitive[1] preferences and act upon those preferences (Arrow, 1951). Of course, when formalized and broken down, there are complicated proofs, axioms, conditions, and qualifications (like transitivity) that in their entirety aid in a more in-depth and coherent understanding of human choice. There are also variables like uncertainty and time that add further to the creation of a more realistic manifestation of the theory. It is, however, at its core that simple.
This does not seem too controversial but it has nonetheless divided the discipline of social science. The arguments against rationality come from both within and without the field. Concerning those arguments from without, they are mainly due to a misunderstanding of the word rational and the use of the idea within the context of scientific inquiry. In common nomenclature, rationality is understood to be something akin to intelligence or the ability to know “the right answer.” The technical definition of rationality, however, makes no mention of “right” or “wrong” (Kahneman, 1994). If anything, a person can act rationally and make a decision that does not get them what they want or that is not in their best interest. Actually, later in this discussion it will be shown that in a democracy perfectly rational voters are led by voting towards totally irrational social choices (choices that are either based on an incoherent ordering of preferences or not based on any preferences at all). Another, accusation brought against rationality is that it over-simplifies what it means to be human and strips away humanity’s sense of morality and individuality. This accusation is half valid. Rationality does over-simplify, but that is the point. Through simplification, the scientific method isolates variables and seeks to gain an understanding of them given that everything else is constant. Once understood, more variables are added to make the theory more realistic. Furthermore, the theory of rationality even at its most basic level still allows for morality and other human traits. Again, it must be emphasized that rationality allows individuals to have whatever preference they want as long as they are coherent, to include things like charity, selfless service, and sacrifice (Arrow, 1951).
The arguments against rationality that originate within behavioral science are more compelling. Some of these arguments challenge rationality’s underlying assumptions. They ask questions concerning whether relationships among preferences are truly transitive or if individual preferences are free from manipulation through the introduction of irrelevant alternatives (Aldred, 2007). These questions are of great importance to rational choice theory and are currently being debated (Kahneman, 1994; Aldred, 2007). Other arguments seek a fuller more comprehensive definition of rationality, especially concerning preferences changing over time and the strength of uncertainty in changing individual decisions (Kahneman, 1994). These, however, seem to accept the basic premise of rationality and really concern its further incorporation into the real world (i.e. adding more variables).
Given voters that act rationally, that is, they have a set of transitive preferences and vote according to those preferences, the next step is to somehow combine the rational preferences of disparate multitudes into a rational set of social preferences. The choice desired by the majority of voters (greater than 50%) should be the one chosen for all. This seems fair but only if the choice is between two options. Should there be more than two options, something that in reality is more than common, problems begin to arise. The possibility of having coalitions smaller than 50% become very high (Riker, 1982). Should this occur, a group could either choose a plurality (the option with simply the most votes) or perhaps try and re-impose majority rule by holding a series of run-off elections between pairs of options. Initially, one would think that the method should not matter; either way, the people’s voice is being expressed and results should be about the same. Yet, if it were decided to compare the results of one method to another, voters would find themselves choosing between different outcomes. It would quickly become apparent that if the run-off were attempted, in the absence of a substantial majority for one option, the outcome of the votes would be based simply on the order in which the votes took place (Riker, 1982). If the plurality were attempted under the same conditions it would be found that, even if a particular option garnered such a plurality, it would be a minority compared with those who preferred other options. To add insult to injury, even if there was a substantial majority –which is a political equilibrium- there is no way of knowing if that majority was a true manifestation of the will of the voters in light of the unknown possibility of strategic voting (voting that occurs when somebody votes against their preferences in an effort to manipulate the results in their favor) (Riker, 1982). Furthermore, should somebody have noticed the forming of a majority early enough, they could have easily destroyed it by introducing other divisive dimensions into the debate (e.g. introducing the issue of abortion into a debate about healthcare or the introduction of budget deficits into a debate about war) thus creating a disequilibrium (Riker, 1982). To further complicate the situation, pluralities and run-offs are not the only possible voting systems to choose from; there are a vast number of systems in use throughout the world, each with its own set of iniquities (Riker, 1982).
Problems like those stated above are just a small sample of the greater dilemma highlighted in Kenneth Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem. Let me emphasize that this dilemma is not simply the product of arbitrary logic; it calls into question the very moral, ideological, and practical foundations of democratic society. In Arrow’s theorem democracy’s greatest weakness is brought to light: There exists no system of voting that simultaneously conforms to minimal conditions of both fairness and rationality.
The big question thus becomes, why is this true? Some explanation is necessary. The basic premise of the theorem is that we expect, at the least, our methods of choice to do two things, (i) we expect it to be fair (ii) and we expect it to provide outcomes that make sense to us. To test whether democracy fulfills these requirements, Mr. Arrow looked for two things (i) a set of minimum conditions for fairness (ii) and a set of minimum conditions for coherence. For coherence he simply applied the same standard used for individuals to society, rationality. This means that the outcomes of voting should fit into a set order of transitive preferences that exemplify what a population likes most and what it likes least. Concerning fairness, he highlighted a set of six conditions[2] that are minimally necessary, both practically and morally, to make social choices. What he discovered was that there exists no system of voting that can ever be created that satisfies these minimal conditions. A voting system either does not fulfill one of the six fairness conditions (calling into question its practicality and morality) or it simply does not make sense (meaning that there is no way to definitively know if one option is preferred to another). Furthermore, it was later discovered that even if a voting system was created that somehow could meet these minimal conditions, there is no way of knowing if its outcomes were a true representation of a group’s preferences because of the possibility of manipulation (i.e. strategic voting or the destruction of majority equilibriums through the introduction of other issues) (Riker, 1982). Through the work of Arrow, Riker, and many others it has been shown that the outcomes of voting, to a great degree, are decided by either chance or manipulation.
This means that the idea of rule by the people, as elegant as it may be, does not hold up to scrutiny. How could it hold true if its outcomes are just as much a function of procedure, manipulation, and plain chance as they are a representation of people’s desires?
Though this fact is damning in relation to ideals held by a great many people, it does little harm to our previous view of democracy. Being unconcerned with the outcomes of voting, it remains a coherent and whole idea. Yet, what good is coherence if it does not make the lives of citizens any better? If viewed statically, democracy can just as easily lead to tyranny as it can to freedom. However, when viewed from a dynamic point of view something very different happens. The importance of elections and term limits comes into play. Before this can be made clear though, the role of political elites and the common voter must be further addressed.
Scene iii- The Villain
Whether it be through pure chance or electoral manipulation, at the end of the day democracies elect leaders. These leaders, just as all people, have preferences and make choices in relation to those preferences. Just as all people are apt to do, they are in a constant struggle to improve their particular lot (Downs, 1957). This desire to maximize welfare (also called utility) is nothing unique to these types of people. It is relative to each person and is related to the context in which that person lives (Downs, 1957). For instance, an executive seeks to improve his own lot through the maximization of profits for the company he represents; Consumers seek to better their lot by maximizing savings in the market-place; and Politicians improve their lot by maximizing votes to gain or maintain public office (Downs, 1957). This implies a certain level of self-interest that is often frowned upon. Is it really so bad to think of people as self-interested though? First and foremost, on a moral level, who are we to judge the interests of others. The complicated and unknowable circumstances of an individual life are far beyond any knowledge that we can hope to attain. The interests of individuals are subjective matters that are derived from their experiences. Therefore, when we look at the self interest of a particular type of actor, we cannot make any judgments pertaining to them being good or bad. Instead we relegate ourselves to logic and a simple observation of outcomes.
The self-interest of politicians is of particular importance to the dynamic nature of democracy. Generally, it is assumed that politicians are in the business of maximizing votes as a means of gaining or retaining office (Downs 1957). This implies that it is possible for the interests of political elites to diverge from the interests of the society as a whole. Considering that the outcomes of voting are detached from the preferences of the voters, why should politicians care to adhere to the needs of the voters if their perpetuation in office is decided by forces out their control or the control of the voters? The answer lies in the fact that, though voters don’t have the ability to consistently choose what they want, they do have the ability to oust what they absolutely abhor. As William Riker states, the voters have something akin to final veto of political policies (Riker, 1982). If an elite implements policies so egregious that it manages to enrage a large enough majority and create an equilibrium opposed to those policies, the elite will be ousted along with the policies. In response to this possibility, elites tend to implement policies that, at the least, try not to offend a large majority of voters; hence, the power of elections to regulate policy and moderate governments (Riker, 1982). However, what happens if a politician is gifted with the charisma to charm away his troubles or the tactfulness to break up adversarial majorities though the introduction of alternative issues? At this point the utility of term limits comes into play. Regardless of how charismatic or smart a politician is, the term limit ensures his or her ouster from office.
Obviously, this implies that we are throwing out the baby with the bathwater. All the efficient, good-willed, and moderate leaders are guaranteed to be taken out of office along with all the corrupt, extreme, and incompetent ones. As heart-breaking as this may be, it is the price that must be paid to ensure that the worst does not prevail.
Scene iv- the Beginning
There is something powerful, and maybe even charming, about the way these mechanisms influence and restrain each other to yield something unexpected. When studied diligently, the interplay of human nature and the institutions humans create has a certain natural elegance to it that too often goes unnoticed and unappreciated. Embodied in democracy, they seem quite well adept, if understood and applied cautiously, at protecting the populations that institute them. They can be moderators of policy and protectors of minority rights. They can perhaps even inspire a devotion to ideals that are detached from the ugly and volatile politics of the day. Democracy, just as people, does not fit into molds for how things should be, but for all its weaknesses and flaws, it is still something that seems to deserve praise instead of scorn.
Certainly, a great many questions still remain unanswered. Questions concerning other actors, like political parties, lobbyists, and other states. It would seem that democracy is demanding our attention. This demand requires the upmost respect for consistency and the ardent avoidance of fallacy. There is much work still to be done. Yet, a first step has been taken and a story begun.
Bibliography
Aldred, J. (2007). Intransitivity and Vague Preferences. The Journal of Ethics , 377-403.
Arrow, K. J. (1951). Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations. Econometrica , 19 (4), 404-437.
Becker, J. (2000). The Chinese. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in Democracy. The Journal of Political Economy , 65 (2), 135-150.
Downs, A. (1987). The Evolution of Democracy: How its Axioms and Institutional Forms Have Been Adapted to Changing Social Forces. Daedalus , 116 (3), 119-148.
Kahneman, D. (1994). New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , 18-36.
Riker, W. H. (1982). Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the The of Social Choice. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
United Nations. (2009). U.N. Security Council: Members. Retrieved Nov 19, 2009, from U.N. Security Council: http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp
[1] “Transitivity- A condition of logical arrangement such that, if one alternative is related in a particular way to a second and if a second is related in the same way to a third, then the first is related in that way to the third.”
-William Riker,
Liberalism Against Populism
[2] The six conditions of fairness in Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem: 1.Universal Admissibility 2.Monotonicity 3.Non-Dictatorship 4.Inpedpendence of Irrelevant Alternative 5.Citizen’s Sovereignty 6. Unanimity